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JUDGES  AS  MEDICAL DECISION  MAKERS:  IS THE  CURE
WORSE  THAN  THE DISEASE?
ALAN  A.  STONE*
n  the short time  available to me, I shall  examine  and criticize  three of
the many judicial decisions  in the area of law  and medicine.  Those  of
you  who like to think of the law as reason and justice tempered by mercy
will be  offended  by  what I have to say; but I shall be evenhanded.  Those
of you who think of medicine  as science and art tempered by  compassion
will also be  offended. My justification for the critical  and polemical  thesis
I shall present  is my deep  and growing conviction that in law, as often as
in medicine,  the  cure can  be  worse than  the disease.  There  is  a  word  in
medicine for cures that create diseases-the word is iatrogenic. Law needs
a similar  word; let me suggest juridicogenic.'
Any discussion of the role of the judiciary in medical decisionmaking in
the  twentieth  century  must  begin  with  the  abortion  decisions:  Roe  v.
Wade' and Doe v. Bolton.'  One aspect of those decisions is relevant  to my
particular thesis. I quote a crucial sentence from Justice Blackmun's  deci-
sion  in Wade: "For  the stage, prior to approximately  the  end of the first
trimester,  the  abortion  decision  and  its  effectuation  must  be left to the
medical judgment  of  the  pregnant  woman's  attending  physician."4  Al-
though we have come  to know the abortion decision  as freedom  of choice
versus  right to  life,  we find Justice  Blackmun  writing  not that the state
must yield to the woman's  choice  but to the  physician's  "medical  judg-
ment."  I assure you this is not just a  sentence taken  out of context. Ear-
lier  in his  opinion,  Blackmun  had  written  that the  attending  physician
before extra-uterine  viability  is free to "determine  . . . that, in his medi-
*Professor of  Law  and  Psychiatry  in  the Faculty of Law  and  the  Faculty of  Medicine,
Harvard  University.
'  Juridicogenic  is an  incorrect  neologism  since it combines  Latin  and  Greek  terms.  Its
use  is justified  only on  the premise that its meaning  will  be  more obvious than  the correct
form,  critogenic,  which  has  been  previously  suggested  by  my  colleague,  Thomas  Butheil,
M.D.
2 410  U.S.  113  (1973).
410 U.S.  179  (1973).
'  410  U.S.  at 164.
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cal judgment,  the  patient's  pregnancy  should  be  terminated." 5 The  lan-
guage  of the  decision throughout misleadingly  suggests that some  crucial
sort of medical judgment is  involved not only in  how the abortion  is per-
formed but whether  the pregnancy  "should  be  terminated."
Justice Burger in his brief comment to the abortion  decisions  chose  to
emphasize  this  very  same crucial  and  misleading  point.
I do not read the Court's holdings today  as having  the sweeping
consequences  attributed  to  them  by  the  dissenting  Justices;  the
dissenting  views  discount  the  reality  that  the  vast  majority  of
physicians  observe the standards of their profession, and  act only
on  the  basis of careful  deliberated  medical judgments  related  to
life  and  health. Plainly,  the  Court today  rejects  any  claims  that
the Constitution  requires  abortions  on  demand.'
What  was the  reality that Justice  White in dissent  had discounted?  Im-
plied  by Blackmun  and  explicit  in the words  of Burger  were  the crucial
and false  notions that the reality  of medical  standards and medical judg-
ment would  keep the woman's  right to an  abortion  from  becoming  abor-
tion  on  demand,  abortion  as  a  routine  form  of  birth  control.  Professor
Noonan, a bitter critic of the abortion decision, refers to this aspect  of the
decision  as the  "doctor  as heroic  figure."
Some have attributed Blackmun  and Burger's "heroic  doctor"  mislead-
ing  language  to political  or personal  motives  or  even to sugar-coated  hy-
pocrisy.  There  are  even  professional  cynics  steeped  in constitutional  law
and court watching who suggest Machiavellian  duplicity on Burger's part.
Burger,  they say,  is waiting  for another  Reagan  appointee  so  that with  a
majority  he  will  then write:  I  never  approved  abortion  on  demand  and
since that is  what it  became  I now join with  those who  reject  Wade and
Bolton.
As  a psychiatrist, I am in the unusual position  of insisting that we take
the Justices'  words at their face value. Of course, the Chief Justice turned
out  to  be  completely  wrong:  the  consequences  predicted  by  the  dissent
were  as accurate  as any judicial  prediction  can  be. As Justice  White cor-
rectly interpreted  the decision,  "any  woman  is entitled  to an  abortion at
her  request  if  she  is  able  to  find  a medical  advisor  willing to undertake
the  procedure.""As  Justice  White  predicted,  abortion has  become  a  rou-
tine  alternative  method  of birth  control.  If  we  take  Justice  Blackmun's
and  Burger's  words  about  medical  judgment  at  face  value,  we  can  only
assume  that  they  were  quite  misled  about  the  medical  profession,  its
medical  standards,  and  the medical  judgments  that were  and  would  be
'  Id. at 163.
o Doe  v.  Bolton,  410  U.S.  at 208.
See  J.  NOONAN,  A  PRIVATE  CHOICE:  ABORTION  IN  AMERICA  IN  THE  SEVENTIES  38-40
(1979).
8  Doe  v. Bolton,  410 U.S.  at 221.
[Vol.  33:579
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applied to  abortion. It was Blackmun  and Burger  who were  out of touch
with  reality if they  honestly  believed what  they  wrote.'
My  point  is  not that the  abortion  decisions  were  wrong  or right  as  a
matter  of law or morality.  My  point is that to the extent these  opinions
involved  factual  inferences  about  medical  standards  and  medical  prac-
tice-inferences  which  suggested  a  context  for  the  decision,  inferences
which  suggested  more  limited  consequences  of the  decision,  inferences
which  suggested the  realities  of medical practice-to that extent, the de-
cision  was quite  misleading.
I claim that such  misleading  statements about medical  realities are not
uncommon  when judges make medical  decisions. I also claim that the  re-
sult of such misleading  statements by judges  is costly.  The credibility of
the  courts  is  undermined  in the  eyes  of the medical  profession,  and the
credibility  of  the  medical  profession  is  undermined  in  the  eyes  of  the
public. The  result  is greater  public distrust of both law and medicine.  A
loss  of  faith  in  both  professions  is  the  result  of  the  vicious  circle  of
counterproductive  moves set in motion by these flawed  decisions. I  shall
of  course  deal  today  with  cases  that  make  this  point.  I  offer  a  critical
perspective  of juridicogenic  decisions,  not a  survey  of the judicial  litera-
ture  on law  and medicine.  However,  I  do want to  claim that the  cases I
shall  cite  are  among  the  most important  law  and  medicine  decisions  on
anyone's  list.
Before  I  leave  the  abortion  decision  I  want to  say  a  few  more words
about the Bolton opinion. In  Wade, Blackmun had  used the  phrase "at-
tending  physician"  to describe the  doctor  who  would  make the  abortion
decision.  This conjures  up an  earlier  time  when  patients  actually  had  a
personal  physician  who attended  them at bedside  both  at  home  and  in
the  hospital, but  is  certainly an inapt phrase  for describing doctors  who
perform  abortion  procedures  in  clinics.
Typically the pregnant woman  is greeted  by a nurse, a social worker, or
an  abortion  counselor.  The  "medical  decision"  is  made  with  them.  She
meets the doctor typically  only after she is "prepped  and in the stirrups."
The physician  is  more  appropriately  characterized  as  a  technician  in  an
assembly line than an attending physician. There are certainly exceptions
to this practice,  but the picture  I describe will certainly be  familiar to the
vast majority  of the participants  in this example  of "deliberated  medical
judgments  related  to  life  and  health."  Doctors,  of  course,  still  use  the
phrase  "attending  physician"  but  with  a  different  meaning.  As  Victor
Fuchs  has written of  contemporary  medical  practice,  my  heart can get a
I  Justice  Blackmun  has  had  a  long  professional  association  with  the  Mayo  Clinic. His
experience  may  be  with  doctors who  if not  "heroic"  are  men and  women  holding  to  the
highest ethical  standards of the profession. Still, it  is unclear how the highest ethical  stan-
dards would or should  influence the medical  decision  to perform  a  procedure which is both
legal  and acceptable  (as Justice  Blackmun took great  pains to point  out) to medical  ethics.
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doctor, my liver can get a doctor, my head  can get a doctor, but I cannot
get  a  doctor.'0  The  nostalgic  image  of the  doctor-patient  relationship  is
important in Bolton because there the  Supreme Court had a great deal to
say  about the  importance  of the  privacy  of the doctor-patient  relation-
ship. The Court made this privacy seem as sacred to law as the privacy  of
the marriage bed. We  shall see how much respect subsequent  courts have
had  for the  privacy of  the doctor-patient  relationship  as  cases  were  de-
cided  in the name  of privacy.
The  next  case  I  shall  discuss  is  the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Judicial
Court's  decision  Superintendent  of  Belchertown  State  School  v.
Saikewicz."  This  was the Massachusetts  Court's  alternative  to the  New
Jersey  Supreme  Court's  Karen  Quinlan  decision.  Quinlan, granting  the
right  of a  comatose  patient  to refuse  extraordinary  care,  left the  actual
medical  decision  to  the  doctors  who  would  take  into  account  any  ex-
pressed preferences of the patient in consultation with the family  and the
hospital ethics  committee. 2  This decision was generally applauded by the
medical  profession, but we should  note that mandatory  review by an eth-
ics committee means the loss of the very kind of privacy that Bolton tried
to protect. Massachusetts  rejected the Quinlan  approach  and reached the
high-water  mark  in judicial  intervention  in  medical  decisionmaking.  In
the Saikewicz decision,  Massachusetts  made the judge the hands-on deci-
sionmaker,  deciding  when to  pull the  plug  on  the  terminally-ill  patient.
The  Massachusetts  case  may be less  well  known to you than Quinlan or
the  abortion  cases,  so  I shall  provide  more  detail.
Joseph  Saikewicz was  a severely retarded sixty-seven year old inmate  of
Belchertown,  a state  institution  for the mentally retarded. During  medi-
cal evaluation  that was itself the result  of a  federal class  action right to
treatment  case,  it  was  discovered  that  Joseph  Saikewicz  had  a  serious
form  of  leukemia  which  the  doctors  predicted  would  kill  him  in  a  few
months whether  treated or not. Saikewicz  had  spent nearly  his entire life
in  the state  institution. He  had  no  relatives to  whom  the  doctors  could
turn for  guidance  about  his preferences.  In fact, Joseph  Saikewicz  never
possessed  the  mental  capacities  necessary  to  formulate  any  preferences
about accepting or refusing extraordinary treatment of a terminal  illness.
Apparently, the doctors were not eager to treat  him; treatment  would in-
volve  taking  him  to  a  general  hospital,  sedating  him  and/or  restraining
him  for  long periods  while  drugs  would  be  given  intravenously  and  in-
trathecally.  The treatment  would  be  painful  and  would  cause  suffering;
and,  given  his mental  disability, it  would  be impossible  to  communicate
with the patient to explain the reasons for the painful treatment. At best,
.0 V.  FUCHS,  WHO  SHALL  LIVE?  67-70  (1974).
373  Mass.  728,  370  N.E.2d  417  (1977).
In re Quinlan,  70  N.J.  10, 54,  355  A.2d  647,  671,  cert. denied, 429  U.S.  922  (1976).
[Vol.  33:579
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treatment would extend Joseph  Saikewicz's  life only a few months. 3  The
doctors  turned to  the probate  court and asked  the judge  to take the  re-
sponsibility for withholding treatment. I have  no doubt that this was be-
cause  they  were  functioning  within  the  regime  of  a  federal  judge  whose
court retained jurisdiction  over all of the state's institutions for the  men-
tally  retarded.  They  were  therefore  as  concerned  about their  own  legal
obligations  and  possible  liabilities  as  they  were  about their  clinical  and
ethical  responsibilities  to Joseph  Saikewicz.  As  Professor  Robert Burt of
Yale  has pointed out in his excellent  book, Taking Care of Strangers, it is
interesting  to  note  that in  both  the  Karen  Ann  Quinlan  and  Saikewicz
cases,  the  doctors  who  testified  in court  made no  effort  to see  how  the
proposed  medical  procedure  would  work.
14  The  expert neurologists  who
testified  in Quinlan did  not disconnect the respirator  or attempt to wean
her  from  the  machine  in  order  to  evaluate  her  response.  The  Supreme
Court  of New Jersey  fully expected  Karen  Quinlan  to die;'  her years  of
continued  existence  were  an  ironic commentary  on judicial  wisdom  and
medical  expertise  in the adversarial  process. Similarly,  the expert  oncolo-
gists did not try to  medicate  Joseph Saikewicz  and take  him to the  gen-
eral  hospital.  Nor  did  they  even  consider  treating  him  in  the  medical
ward  of the state  institution.
When  doctors  see the threatening shadows  of the  law, they  forget that
they  are  doctors  with personal  responsibility;  they  act  to minimize  their
own  risks; they often call in their lawyers and do what they are told; they
often  behave  very much like  bureaucrats. Indeed  there  is a  high correla-
tion  between  the  increasing  judicial  and  legislative  intervention  in
medicine and  the increasing  bureaucratization  of medical  care. For every
legal  intervention  another  committee  is  created.  Thus,  by  casting  what
seem like threatening  shadows, the courts have influence  far beyond their
actual  decisions on medical practice. Juridicogenic cures  contribute to the
bureaucratization  of medical  care.
The judge  in the Saikewicz case  could not easily  say that an ordinary
or reasonable person  would refuse the treatment. The oncologists testified
that  in  their  experience  almost  everyone  accepted  the  treatment  even
when told that the benefits  were meager.'  The hearing transcript reveals
that on that basis the judge was in fact about to order that the treatment
be  given  when the medical  experts  once again emphasized  the difficulties
of  communication,  the  suffering  involved  in  the treatment,  and  Joseph
Saikewicz's  assumed  inability  to  tolerate  what  would  be  happening  to
him. The judge  reversed  ground  at the last  moment  and ruled  that the
" Saikewicz, 373  Mass.  at 729-35,  370 N.E.2d  at 419-22.
"4  R. BURT,  TAKING  CARE  OF  STRANGERS  153-58  (1979).
"  See  70 N.J.  at  54, 355  A.2d  at 671.
Saikewicz, 373  Mass.  at 733-34,  370  N.E.2d  at 421.
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treatment  need  not be  given."'  Joseph  Saikewicz  died  of  leukemia;  like
Karen  Quinlan,  he was  completely  unaware  of the  controversy  surround-
ing  him.
What  is  important for  our  purposes  is  the  way  the  Massachusetts  Su-
preme  Judicial  Court  subsequently  fashioned  their  juridicogenic  formula
for  the  right  of  terminal  patients  to  refuse  treatment.  As  I  have  sug-
gested,  they  could  not  apply  a  reasonable  person  test  to  justify  the
Saikewicz decision;  if a reasonable  person is a person who does what most
people  in that situation would  do,  Saikewicz should  have  been  given  the
treatment. Further, they  could not easily  decide the  case  by a best inter-
est test. They  might  have said that in the circumstances  of Saikewicz it
was  in the best interest of a  mentally  retarded  person  to refuse  a  treat-
ment which non-retarded  persons  would accept;  but that might  start the
court down  the slippery slope of "quality of life,"  and sound like discrimi-
nation  against the  mentally  retarded.  The  Massachusetts  court was  also
unwilling to follow the New  Jersey Quinlan precedent. In its judicial wis-
dom,  the  court  decided  that  the right  of  all  incompetent  terminally  ill
patients  to  refuse  life-sustaining  treatments  should  not  be  delegated  to
doctors,  relatives, and ethics committees.  They concluded that only  in an
adversarial  hearing  with  a legal  guardian  for the patient and  a  guardian
ad litem to argue for treatment would the potentially  conflicting interests
of patients,  families,  and  doctors  be  properly  confronted.'
8  It  is  ironic
that the court looked  to the right  of privacy as  one of the basic justifica-
tions for this complex and intrusive  legal process. Adversarial  due process
would be the American  way of death, at least in Massachusetts. The court
made  no mention of the impact  of its decision on the doctor-patient  rela-
tionship  or  the cost of privacy.
Having decided that momentous  question which put an end to the right
of  such patients  to die  in  peace  and  medical  privacy,  the court  reached
out  for  a  legal  formula  to  apply  in  the  adversarial  hearing  that would
accent the positive  theme  of patients' rights while  empowering judges to
exercise those rights. The court adopted the standard of substituted judg-
ment  or  proxy  consent;  the  judge  alone  could  exercise  this  proxy  con-
sent. 9  After  an  adversarial  hearing,  the  judge  would  make  the  medical
decision  by  attempting  to  decide  what  the  incompetent  patient  would
himself decide  if competent.2"  In  a subsequent similar case in New  York,
a medical expert was asked  by a judge to help him decide this very ques-
tion:  What  would  a  mentally  retarded  person  want  if he  knew  he  had
cancer  of the bladder, if he  could  fully understand the  risks and benefits
17  Transcript  at  43, In re Saikewicz,  No. 45596  (Mass. P. Ct. Hampshire County May  13,
1976),  reprinted in R.  BuRT, supra note  14, at 156-57.
" Id. at 755-59,  370  N.E.2d at 432-35.
Id. at 751,  370  N.E.2d  at 431.
2  Id. at 752-53,  370  N.E.2d  at 431.
[Vol.  33:579
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of cancer treatment, and if he could understand  the effects of his mental
retardation on the treatment process. The expert answered:  "Your Honor,
that is like asking me if it snowed all summer, would it be winter?"21 This
wonderful  answer  captures  the  absurdity  of imposing  legal  formulas  on
the  complex  real  world of medical  decisionmaking-an  absurdity  which
the  Supreme  Judicial Court  of Massachusetts  could  not see,  so  mesmer-
ized was  it  by its own recitation of legal  incantations which appeal to the
all-powerful  libertarian notion of individual autonomy and the panacea  of
due  process.
Due process  is to some judges what tranquilizing drugs are to some psy-
chiatrists-they  solve  the judge's  and  the  doctor's problem  even  if they
do  not address  the  real  difficulty. The judge  must  exercise  the patient's
autonomous  choice;  only  in this  way  can  the patient's  rights  be  served.
The  idea is  logical  but logic  is  sometimes  pushed  to absurdity  when ap-
plied  by  judges  to the  realities  of the  medical  world.  Joseph  Saikewicz
was  a  classic  example;  he  did  not  have  the  capacity  to  develop  prefer-
ences-how  could  a judge  know  what his  preferences  would  be?  Judges
are not fools, of course, and the supreme judicial  court recognized that in
a  case  like  Saikewicz, the  subjective  proxy consent  might  come  close  to
being  an  objective  test.2 2  Nonetheless,  the  court  offered  specific  guide-
lines  to  help judges  decide  what  they thought  would  be  in  the  person's
mind, if he had a mind.
2
3 This gave  a semblance of clear and simple rules
for  making what  is in reality  an ambiguous  and  difficult  decision.
Saikewicz  was not limited to incompetent mentally retarded persons  in
state mental institutions as  it could have  been by a  less activist court. In
one bold and arrogant step applauded by civil libertarians, probate judges
in Massachusetts were  given the authority to preside  over death.  Ivan  I1-
lich,  a  priest  and  radical  critic  of  modern  medicine,  has  described  the
medical  profession  as  a  priesthood  presiding  over  and  denying  natural
death.24  I  wonder whether he would  count  it an advance of civilization to
impose on the medical priesthood a judicial College of Cardinals. The cost
of  dying  in  America  is  staggering;  estimates  are  that  eleven  percent  of
Medicare  is expended  on  dying. 2  The financial costs are  only one part of
the picture.
The  Saikewicz decision, as  interpreted  by  lawyers to  doctors, required
the  doctors  to  postpone any  decisions  to  forego or  terminate  treatment
and  to  keep  all  incompetent  dying  patients  in  Massachusetts  alive,  no
matter how futile  the treatment, while  they rushed about getting consul-
" In  re  Storar,  52  N.Y.2d  363,  380,  420 N.E.2d  64,  72-73,  438  N.Y.S.2d  266,  275, cert.
denied, 454  U.S.  858  (1981).
See  Saikewicz, 373  Mass. at 750-51,  370  N.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 752-55,  370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
I.  ILLICH,  LIMITS  TO  MEDICINE  201-08  (1976).
25 V.  FUCHS,  How  WE  LIVE  199  (1983)(citing  J. LUBITZ,  M.  GORNICK  & R.  PRIHODA,  USE
AND  COSTS  OF  MEDICARE  SERVICES  IN THE  LAST  YEAR  OF  LIFE  (1981)).
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tations  and  their  lawyers  rushed  about  arranging  for  the required  legal
hearing and  the judicial  proxy decision.  Saikewicz, the  lawyers  said,  ap-
plied to  deformed  premature  infants  (anticipating the  Baby  Doe  regula-
tions)  as  well  as  to  senile  and  comatose  adults.  Many  physicians  com-
mented on the resulting pattern of overtreatment and undertreatment.  If
treatment  had  begun  doctors  were  afraid  to stop  the treatment  without
prior  court  approval. And  it was  said that in  some  cases, treatment  was
never  initiated  in  order to  avoid  legal  entanglements.  Doctors cannot  be
absolved  of their responsibility for such iatrogenic  harms but neither can
courts be  absolved of their responsibility for  the juridicogenic harms such
decisions  produce.  Remember  the  language  in these  decisions  about pri-
vacy;  guardians  were  to  be appointed  in every  case.  Lawyers  and  expert
witnesses  were  to conduct adversarial  hearings. The hospital and its law-
yers  became concerned  about the hospital's liability in light of Saikewicz;
they felt the need to police their physicians in addition  to any court pro-
ceedings-the  patient's "attending  physician"  had  to report to the Death
Committee-specialists,  nurses,  and  ethicists  had  to  be  consulted.  In
short, as  happens  so often  in  law,  where  due  process  has  been,  bureau-
cracy  follows  and  here  in the name  of  privacy, privacy  was  lost.
The Saihewicz decision  stood for  two  powerful principles.  First, courts
not  doctors  should  make  these  decisions  about  life  and  death.  Second,
those  judicial  decisions  should  reflect  what  the  patient  himself  would
choose.  As to the first  principle, the  court's decision was  greeted with  re-
sounding  approval  by  some  health  lawyers  concerned  about  patients'
rights,  and  it  was  greeted  by  outrage  and  derision  by  almost  all  physi-
cians. The vicious circle I described  earlier in this talk began; the medical
profession  lost a great deal  of its respect  for the court. For example, the
editor  of  the  New  England Journal of Medicine openly  criticized  and
condemned the court.
2 6 The public became confused  and suspicious about
both professions;  families  were  bewildered.  The  realities,  the  costs,  and
the  logistics  of  death  with  due  process  were  soon  recognized,  and  the
Massachusetts  courts  backed  away  from  Saikewicz  as  applied  to  dying
patients.
First  in  the  appellate  case  In  re  Dinnerstein,
2  7  and  then  in  In  re
Spring,
2 8 the Supreme Judicial  Court of Massachusetts  came close to the
New  Jersey  approach  in  Quinlan. I  believe  the  aggressive  step forward
and the two  steps  backward  had  undermined  the  credibility  of both  the
court and the medical profession.  Earl  Springs, an elderly man with renal
failure, was the subject of the second step back. His right to refuse kidney
dialysis treatment became  a struggle  between  a right to life nurse on the
11 Relman,  The Saikewicz Decisicn: Judges as Physicians, 298  NEW  ENG.  J. MED.  508
(1978).
27  6  Mass.  App.  Ct. 466,  380  N.E.2d  134 (1978).
2'  380  Mass.  629,  405 N.E.2d  115  (1980).
[Vol.  33:579
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one side  and his relatives  on the other. Were  his relatives letting him die
to save money?  Did he want to die?  Was  he  really incompetent?  Did the
right to life nurse,  who had  no responsibility for Earl Springs,  invade his
privacy?  These  questions  were  argued  and  reargued  in  the  courts  and
played  out  in  the  media  as  a  public  spectacle  that even  Earl  Springs'
death did  not end. When  my former  colleague,  then Justice Braucher,  of
the  supreme judicial  court,  wrote  the Springs decision,  he  reached  for  a
crafty compromise.  Doctors  need not turn to the courts in every case,  but
they  must  accept  any  civil  or  criminal  liability  that might  follow  from
their  actions  and  decisions.29  On  the  other  hand,  he  opined  that  when
such  medical  decisions  are  made  in  accord  with  professional  standards
and  with  proper  consultations,  liability seemed  highly unlikely.3 0  This  is
what Saikewicz had  meant all along, the court is there only when needed.
But  the  need  is  determined  by  fear  of legal  liability.  I  know  of doctors
who advise  families  with  elderly  parents  who suffer  from  chronic  recur-
ring  ailments,  such  as  congestive  heart  failure,  as follows:  "Look,  if you
think  it is  time  for your  parent to die,  do not  bring them to the  emer-
gency room; if you do,  I  will treat them. I do not allow  my patients  to die
unless the treatment  is entirely  futile."  I doubt that the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts  had in mind  such juridicogenic consequences  and
I doubt that families given such advice are  left with a sense of confidence
in  either  the  medical  or  the  legal  profession.  Now  lawyers  may  justly
claim  that this  advice  is  not what  the court intended,  nor does  it follow
from what  the  court actually  wrote.  But  iatrogenic  harms  do  not follow
from  what  doctors  intend  or  from  what  is  actually  written  in  medical
texts. The medical maxim that guards against iatrogenesis  is primum non
nocere; judges who make  medical  decisions might do well to  consider the
same  maxim.
Now it is important to emphasize that I believe that in all of the cases I
have  described  there are  deep and  profound  moral problems  created  by
new  biotechnology,  and  when  I teach  these cases  to  my  students,  I  ex-
plore these moral  problems, and  I find that we have  no moral consensus
because  we  inevitably  reach  the  slippery  slope of "quality of life."  How-
ever  each  of you would  solve  these moral problems,  my purpose  today is
only to suggest that judges have not yet come up with good legal cures  for
these  difficult moral  problems.
Thus far  I have  said nothing about judicial  decisionmaking  in  my  own
medical  specialty of psychiatry. In this last part of my talk I shall turn to
that  subject  briefly.  While  Massachusetts  doctors,  lawyers,  and  judges
were  struggling  with Saikewicz,  a  case  involving the right  of psychiatric
patients to refuse  drug treatment  was making its way through the Massa-
Id.  at 637,  405 N.E.2d  at 121.
Id. at 638-39,  405  N.E.2d at 121-22.
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chusetts Federal Court.
3 1 Civil libertarian lawyers argued that involuntary
civilly  committed  patients  had  a  constitutional  right  to  refuse  antipsy-
chotic drugs  except in emergencies  when  they were  imminently violent.
32
An activist federal  district judge  did  all that he  could to  get the  Depart-
ment of Mental Health and the libertarian  lawyers to find a compromise.
Perhaps to  press the  Department  of Mental  Health,  he  issued a  tempo-
rary restraining order against involuntary  drug  treatment;"  however,  the
Department  of Mental  Health  could  find  no  compromise.  To  psychia-
trists, an acute psychotic episode  is itself an emergency,  and I believe  that
anyone  who  has  spent  a  few  days  in  a  mental  hospital  or  in  the  same
room with an acutely  psychotic person  would agree. Furthermore,  despite
the fact that antipsychotic  drugs can be and  have  been abused  as chemi-
cal  restraints,  when  properly  prescribed,  they  are  highly  efficacious.  In
fact,  antipsychotic drugs  are perhaps  the only psychiatric  treatment with
proven efficacy. To psychiatrists, the idea that someone  was crazy enough
to be  involuntarily  committed,  but then has  the right  to refuse  the  only
efficacious treatment seemed  like the kind of law and justice one finds  in
the  novels  of Franz  Kafka.
Unfortunately,  it was difficult to formulate these  views into  a  good  le-
gal argument.  The  Massachusetts  law  of civil  commitment  had  been  re-
formed under the influence  of civil libertarians whose views were that the
law  should be purged  of all psychiatric  concepts  and  should  be  replaced
by  objective  legal  criteria  emphasizing  acts  rather  than  status.  So  re-
formed,  the Massachusetts  civil commitment  statutes said  nothing about
acute  psychosis  or  incompetence  to  make  medical  decisions.  The  plain
language  of the statute  indicated that a committed patient might be  dan-
gerous to self or others but still competent to refuse treatment. The attor-
ney general's  office nonetheless attempted  to argue,  as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, that the  need  to be involuntarily  confined  should be
equated  with  incompetence,  an  argument  that was  unacceptable  to  the
court.
34  Clearly, the idea of forcing treatment on a presumably competent
patient  was  alien  to  common  law  and  constitutional  theory. The  plain-
tiffs'  lawyers  also  made  much  of the  significant  side  effects  associated
with antipsychotic  drugs.
3 5 Thus  in this worst case  scenario  a potentially
dangerous  drug  was  being  foisted  on  a  presumably  competent,  although
involuntarily  committed, patient.
The district  court  judge  held that there  was  a  constitutional  right  to
refuse  treatment  except  in  emergencies  characterized  by  imminent  vio-
" Rogers  v.  Okin, 478  F.  Supp.  1342  (D.  Mass.  1979),  vacated,  634  F.2d  650  (lst Cir.
1980),  vacated  sub noma.  Mills  v. Rogers,  457  U.S.  291  (1982).
22  Id.  at 1352.
22  Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1353,  1361-62.
Id. at 1359-60.
[Vol.  33:579
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lence.' 6 As to the psychiatrists'  concerns that they could not know when a
patient was imminently violent,  he observed  in a footnote  that many pro-
fessions had difficult tasks." 7  An acute psychosis was not an emergency in
his view, and the patient's refusal of treatment  could only be overcome by
a  competency  hearing  and  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  who  would
then, as you can  anticipate,  make  a proxy decision. 38 Thus, the guardian
could,  in  theory at least,  choose to  honor  the incompetent  involuntarily
committed patient's refusal of the only available efficacious  treatment. As
to the argument  that it then  took  three weeks  to schedule  a  competency
hearing,  the  judge  opined that  the  state  courts  could  easily  rectify  the
logistics.39  Lurking  in the judge's  decision  was  the idea that  respect  for
individual  autonomy  includes  the  right to be  psychotic at state  expense
and he  said as much. I consider the decision of this court to be one  of the
most misguided, injudicious, juridicogenic  opinions in the entire  case law
of  law  and psychiatry.  The  judge's  original temporary  restraining  order
demonstrated  a total disregard  for professional  standards  of care,  or the
potential  harms to psychotic  patients  who refused  needed treatment. He
needlessly  and  heedlessly  turned  the  clock  of  mental  health  care  back
thirty  years.  His  temporary  restraining  order  and  his  ultimate  decision
left the psychiatric  profession muttering that the judge was  out of touch
with  reality.  Case  reports  began  to  appear  of  patients  whose  treatable
psychotic disorder went untreated  month after month. Again  the cycle of
public dissatisfaction  with law and psychiatry  was set in motion. The toll
of juridicogenic harms  will never be  tallied, but the cost in human suffer-
ing,  the economic cost  to  the state, and  the  morale  cost to  public sector
psychiatry  are all  too real  to be ignored. The decisions Rogers v.  Okin,4 0
Mills v.  Rogers,"'  and  mercifully at last, Rogers v.  Commissioner of  the
Department of Mental Health 4'  went up through the First Circuit to the
Supreme Court, back to the First Circuit, and  then to the Massachusetts
Supreme  Judicial  Court  for  interpretation  of applicable  state  law.  That
court  had  backed  away from  Saikewicz in the  manner  I have  described,
but now  in the  context  of psychiatry,  it reasserted  the entire  Saikewicz
procedure  making  the  judge  and  not  a  guardian  the  proxy  deci-
sionmaker.
4'  Think of it, doctors,  if they  are  not afraid  of liability,  can
now  after  consultation  with  relatives  and  ethics  committees  either  pro-
vide  aggressive  treatment  or  pull the  plug  on  incompetent  terminal  pa-
Id. at 1364-65.
Id. at 1369  n.36.
38 Id.  at 1362-65.
"  Id.  at 1363.
4o 478  F. Supp.  1342  (D. Mass.  1979),  vacated,  634 F.2d  650  (1st Cir.  1980), vacated sub
nom. Mills  v.  Rogers,  457 U.S.  291  (1982).
457  U.S.  291  (1982).
"  390  Mass.  489,  458 N.E.2d  308  (1983).
Id. at 496-507,  458 N.E.2d  at 312-19.
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tients without a due process  hearing, but psychiatrists cannot  treat invol-
untarily  committed  mental  patients without both  a  competency  hearing
and, if the patient  is  found incompetent,  a  proxy  consent  by a judge.
Thus,  the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Judicial  Court  went  even  further
than  the  Federal  Court's  misguided  decision,  closing  its  eyes  to  the
juridicogenic  harms,  it  locked  the  mental health  system  into  procedures
which emphasized  the libertarian  view  of rights and individual autonomy
and ignored the needs of patients and the costs of human suffering. What
can it mean to speak of individual  autonomy when the person  is trapped
in a terrifying  web of delusions and  hallucinations?  How  does the right to
be  psychotic  advance  the  goal of individual autonomy  in  a  free  society?
The juridicogenic  harms of such decisions are now visible in the streets of
every major city  as  the homeless  mentally  ill exercise their autonomy  by
sleeping  in the streets and by  rummaging for food  in trash cans.  Can the
public  have  respect  for  law or  for  psychiatry  when they  witness  this tri-
umph of the libertarian  theory of rights and this disregard  for the  needs
and the  suffering  of the mentally  ill?
Let us now consider the role of the judge as proxy  consenter or medical
decisionmaker  in  the case  of mental  patients. The  judge,  when  he or  she
determines  that the  involuntarily  committed  patient  is  legally  incompe-
tent to  make medical  decisions,  is  asked  to consider  six  factors:
1)  any expressed  preference  by the patient;
2)  any religious  preferences;
3)  the impact  of the  decision  on  the  family  as  it  would  influence  the
patient;
4) the  possibility  of  adverse side  effects;
5)  prognosis  without treatment  from the  unique  perspective  of the pa-
tient; and
6)  prognosis with treatment-while  not conclusive, a good prognosis  en-
hances the  likelihood  that the patient  would  accept  treatment.
With these  factors  in  mind, judges  in  Massachusetts  are  expected  to
make  psychiatric  decisions. Again,  consider  the costs  involved:  there are
the court  costs, the time of the doctors and  lawyers, and if the judge ref-
uses to order drug treatment, there is the added  cost to the state of weeks
of unnecessary confinement  at an estimated cost  of $200  a day.  Since our
state hospitals,  now sharply  reduced  in beds,  are filled  to capacity,  there
is also the  cost  involved  in depriving  other patients  of needed  treatment
or the  alternative  of dumping untreated  patients back  on  the streets.
One must ask how judges  could make these psychiatric  decisions.  How
can a judge, to whom the patient  is a total  stranger and  who  knows  little
or nothing about drugs and mental illness,  assess the preferences, the  im-
pact of family suffering  on the patient, and  the prognosis  with and  with-
out treatment  from the unique  perspective  of the patient?  The short an-
swer, I  believe,  is that they cannot,  and anecdotal  evidence  suggests  two
typical patterns of judicial decisionmaking.  First, they decide  whether the
patient  is  competent  or  not. If  not competent,  they  routinely  order  the
[Vol.  33:579
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drug treatment. Thus after costly and  time-consuming delays, proxy con-
sent  is  a  myth  in  their court. A  second  pattern  is  for the judges  to  rou-
tinely require  the treating psychiatrist  to answer the six questions.  Thus,
after  all  is  said and  done,  these judges  put the  ball  back  in psychiatry's
court  after  forcing  us  to  play  the  legal  game  by  their  complicated  and
costly  legal  rules.  Elsewhere,  I  have  argued  that  ethical  psychiatrists
should refuse to accept clinical responsibility for patients when judges ex-
ercising proxy consent determine that incompetent patients should not be
given  what  the  psychiatrist  in  good  faith  believes  to  be  essential  treat-
ment-I  consider  such  a situation  court-ordered  malpractice.
4
4
Remember, we are not talking about mentally ill  persons who are walk-
ing  the  streets;  however  the  civil  commitment  statute  is  worded,  we  are
considering  only those  mentally  ill  patients  who were  so  disturbed  that,
unlike  the thousands  of mentally  ill  who  live  in  the  streets,  they  were
hospitalized. Elsewhere,  I  have described a  model civil  commitment  stat-
ute  which  makes  incompetence  a  necessary  criterion  for  civil  commit-
ment."  This  approach  is  not  without  problems,  but surely  it is  a  more
sensible  remedy  than  the  Saikewicz/Rogers  formula  fashioned  by  the
Massachusetts  Supreme  Judicial  Court.
I want to  m'ake  one final general  comment. Health  care now consumes
eleven percent  of the gross  national product."  Health  care costs are what
make American  cars  cost more than Japanese cars. Unless aggregate costs
are  controlled,  Medicare  will be bankrupt by  1990.
47  This will happen as
the number of elderly people  entitled to Medicare steadily  increases. Gov-
ernment  is  desperate  to  control  the  aggregate  cost  of  health  care.  As
lawmakers  seek  to control costs, the medical  industry is being  both regu-
lated  and  deregulated  at  the  same  time.  Government  is  creating  incen-
tives to  force doctors to  consider  the aggregate  cost of health care  in de-
ciding  what  is  appropriate  treatment  for  individual  patients. This  poses
terrible ethical  problems which  good economists, Lester Thurow  for  one,
point  out  cannot  be  solved  by  economists.48  Equally true  is  that these
ethical  problems  cannot  be  solved  by  doctors, their  own  code  of  ethics
give  no clear guidance.  Will they be  solved by judges?  Based  on my own
reading and  studying  I cannot  be  sanguine  about the ability  of judges to
solve these problems without substantial juridicogenic  harm. Some  courts
proceed  more  sensibly than  others. In my opinion,  Quinlan is much  bet-
ter  than  Saikewicz.  One  thing  seems  clear,  however,  decisions  like
44 A.  STONE,  Psychiatric Abuse and Legal Reform: Two  Ways to Make a Bad Situation
Worse, in  LAW,  PSYCHIATRY  AND  MORALITY  133-56  (1984).
41  A.  STONE,  MENTAL  HEALTH  AND  LAW:  A  SYSTEM  IN  TRANSITION  65-79  (1975).
4'  Freeland  & Schendler, Health Spending in the 1980's; Integration  of Clinical Practice
Patterns with Management, HEALTH  CARE  FINANCING  REV.
11  BOARD  OF  TRUSTEES,  FEDERAL  HOSPITAL  INSURANCE  TRUST  FUND  (1983 ANNUAL  REPORT),
H.R. Doc. No. 75,  98th  Cong.,  1st Sess. 46  (1983).
"  See  L. THUROW,  DANGEROUS  CURRENTS  24-27  (1983).
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Saikewicz and Rogers and the growth of malpractice  liability give  doctors
a clear  message-ignore  the aggregate cost of health care in treating indi-
vidual patients. These judicial  messages directly  contradict the legislative
message  of cost control. These mixed legal messages  will set the stage for
an ethical crisis in law and medicine over the next decade for which  there
will  be  no easy  answers.  The  law and  the  courts  will surely play  a large
part in dealing with this crisis:  law and medicine  will have to learn to live
together  or everyone  will  pay the price  of increased  loss of confidence  in
both professions.
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